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I. INTRODUCTION
The legendary philosopher John Locke envisioned a world where every
person possesses equal and inalienable rights that are the foundation of democ-
racy and democratic thought. Interestingly enough, Locke was notorious for
supporting the ideal that atheistic thought, or any blasphemous thought for that
matter, should be restricted upon the basis that it undermines religion and the
1
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importance of God.' At first glance, this belief would seem at odds with his
philosophy, yet the idea that "dangerous" speech deserves no constitutional pro-
tection has ?lagued conceptions of a democratic society throughout our Ameri-
can history. Why, one must ask, does this problem still persist in our modem
society? This Note will attempt to answer this vital question through focusing
on the current landscape of public schools and the scope of their abilities to cen-
sor student speech. More specifically, this Note explains why public schools
should not discriminate based upon viewpoint when dealing with speech or ex-
pression unrelated to the school's educational mission. 3 Schools must be pre-
pared to assert independent reasons for student censorship unrelated to view-
point if the First Amendment is to have any weight in the public school system.
The government carries the responsibility of preparing a child for her
role in society through the public school system. The extent of the educator's
role, however, creates a divide between two schools of thought that is preemi-
nently displayed in the majority opinion and dissent for Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.4 Writing for the majority of the Court,
Justice Fortas emphatically stated that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.",5 If the
school is responsible for preparing its students for citizenship, free expression
requires vigilant protection, for students possess fundamental rights that a
6school may not circumvent through indoctrination. Essentially, Justice Fortas
promotes the view that a school exists as a "marketplace of ideas," or an avenue
for discourse that helps develop the minds of its students and society.7
The opposing view stands in stark contrast to the marketplace of ideas
concept, arguing that students should be indoctrinated as opposed to engaged in
discourse.8 Justice Black promulgated this view in his dissent, asserting the idea
that great deference should be provided to school officials when making deci-
sions over student speech:
JOHN LOCKE, A LETrER ON TOLERATION 135 (Raymond Klibansky ed., Oxford University
Press 1968) (1689).
2 The Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 stat. 217 (repealed 1921), and the Sedition Act
of 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 stat. 553 (repealed 1921), both restricted speech critical of the United
States war effort to extreme lengths. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (con-
victing Eugene Debs over a speech opposing the war); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51
(1919) (convicting protestors who passed out leaflets criticizing the draft).
3 The current standard set forth by the Supreme Court allows public schools to censor student
expression when the speech is school-sponsored or carries the mark of the school. See Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-76 (1988).
4 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See generally Erwin
Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates:
What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 527 (2000).
5 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
6 Id. at 511.
7 Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
8 Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
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The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet aban-
doned as worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet
reached the point of experience and wisdom which enabled
them to teach all of their elders. It may be that the Nation has
outworn the old-fashioned slogan that "children are to be seen
not heard," but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the
thought that taxpayers send children to school on the premise
that at their age they need to learn, not teach.9
Therefore, this concept of education would allow school officials to ap-
ply viewpoint discrimination, for school decisions over student speech must rest
within the school's authoritative role under a low standard of judicial review. °
Consider the following hypothetical: A student named Christina attends
a public high school in small town West Virginia. She practices atheism as her
belief system along with both students and adults. Never afraid to assert her
First Amendment rights in any given context, Christina actively participates in
local organizations that share her views and she writes for an online journal
concerning the lifestyles of teenage atheists. One day in school, her history
teacher gives an assignment asking the students to write an essay about what
they would do to change the current landscape of American government. Al-
though the teacher does not give any specific instructions about writing the pa-
per, the general consensus is that the students must implement governmental
theories learned in class within their respective essays. The best essays will be
presented at a school-sponsored function to students and various faculty mem-
bers.
Christina decides to write about the principles of atheism, arguing that
all governmental leaders should disregard organized religion entirely and be-
come atheists. Christina's teacher, not one to deny craftsmanship, gives her a
superior grade on the assignment but refuses to allow Christina to speak at the
function. When she complains to the school principal about the situation, the
principal takes the side of the teacher and agrees that Christina's speech would
be inappropriate at this particular function. After explaining the situation to her
parents, Christina files suit against the school for violating her freedom of
speech by discriminating against her viewpoint without offering an independent
reason to support the restriction. The school argues that it did not discriminate
based upon Christina's viewpoint, but instead denied her access to the forum
because it interfered with the school's legitimate pedagogical concerns.' Based
upon these facts, who should prevail? Unfortunately, no clear answer is appar-
ent in First Amendment jurisprudence, and a current circuit split exists as to
9 Id.
10 Id. at 515-26.
1 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988).
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whether public schools may discriminate based upon a viewpoint or whether
they must remain viewpoint-neutral at all times when making restrictions.
The First and Tenth Circuits expressly hold that educators may make
viewpoint-based decisions about school-sponsored or school-related speech,
12
yet the Second and Ninth Circuits hold that the general requirement of view-
point neutrality must be upheld even in non-public or designated public fo-
rums.1 3 The split arose out of modem interpretations of the seminal Supreme
Court case Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,14 which held that public
schools may limit student speech when the limitations are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.1 5 The Court never expressly stated that view-
point discrimination is a justifiable concept, but jurisdictions such as the First
and Tenth Circuits argue that the Court implied within its reasoning that such
discrimination is necessary for schools to fulfill their guardian role.16 After a
careful evaluation of all significant First Amendment issues, it is clear that the
Ninth and Second Circuit holdings provide the proper solution in concluding
that public schools must remain viewpoint neutral when determining whether to
restrict a student's speech.
This Note will argue that public schools should adopt the viewpoint-
neutral approach when evaluating student speech because of the inalienable
rights imbedded within the First Amendment.1 7 Part II of this Note will provide
the background of student speech in public schools and discuss the scope of
public forums and viewpoint discrimination within the public school setting.
Part I will analyze the current split over the interpretation of Hazelwood
through illustrating cases that reject viewpoint discrimination and cases that
promote its value in the public school system. Part IV will debate the issue by
analyzing the legal reasoning employed by the circuits, ultimately concluding
that Hazelwood did not give school officials the authority to discriminate based
on viewpoint. Part V will offer a more theoretical approach to the matter and
attempt to provide school officials with guidelines to properly evaluate their
institution's educational role. Finally, Part VI will conclude the Note with an
epilogue concerning the Christina hypothetical, championing the marketplace of
ideas theory promoted by Justice Fortas that students should not be silenced for
expressing legitimate viewpoints.
1 8
12 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993); Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298
F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
13 Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005); Planned
Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
14 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260.
15 Id. at 272-76.
16 See discussion infra Parts llI.B. 1-2.
17 "In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School offi-
cials do not possess absolute authority over their students." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
18 Id. at 512.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STUDENT SPEECH WITHIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
When evaluating the current scope of authority that schools may exer-
cise when restricting student speech, it is important to understand the evolution
of this area of law. Two major Supreme Court cases, Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District19 and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,20 provide the foundation for analyzing First Amendment issues aris-
ing in public schools. These two cases are solid bookends in the debate between
the conflicting freedoms between schools and students, and thus require a thor-
ough evaluation.2 '
A. The Liberal Approach: How Tinker Offered Extensive Protection of
Student Speech
The issue in Tinker dealt specifically with the extent of student expres-
sion in the public school setting. The Court held that school officials may only
restrict speech when the expression substantially disrupts the school environ-
ment.2 2 The facts underlying Tinker concerned two high school students and
one junior high school student who displayed their objections to the Vietnam
War by wearing black armbands throughout December.2 3 The principals of the
Des Moines schools found out about the planned protest and enacted a policy
where "any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it,
and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without the arm-
band., 24 The students, aware of the policy, persisted in wearing the armbands
and were suspended.25
The students' fathers filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, which held that the school's actions were reasonable
due to the potential disturbance that the armbands may cause at the school.26
19 Id.
20 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
21 On June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court issued its decision for Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (2007), the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" case. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, held that "schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use." Id. at 2622. This hold-
ing carries no weight with respect to viewpoint discrimination, for it merely creates an independ-
ent and narrow rule that restricts student expression linked to drug use. Therefore, for the pur-
poses of this Note, Morse will not be discussed because it does not coordinate with religious or
political student speech.
22 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
23 Id. at 504.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 504-05.
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The court rejected the substantial disruption test of Burnside v. Byars27 and in-
stead deferred to the decision of the schools. Tinker was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals with no opinion. 28 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court,
insistent that students and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"29 reversed the lower
court's holding, and held that the wearing of the black armbands was entitled to
full constitutional protection.3°
Throughout its decision, the Court focused on the ultimate importance
of the freedoms of expression and speech preserved in the First Amendment. It
rejected the District Court's argument that the school authorities acted reasona-
bly because "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression., 31 By adopting the substantial
disruption test in Byars,32 the Court took a firm stance against absolute regula-
tory authority for school officials. 33 If anything, the Court reasoned that the
students' display of the armbands would facilitate debate and intercourse, thus
the school would be strengthened through its designated role as a particular
"marketplace of ideas." 34
The holding in Tinker is relevant to the present discussion because the
Court took an aggressive stance against viewpoint discrimination in public
schools.35 In response to the fact that the school permitted the portrayal of Nazi
and Iron Cross symbols, the Court stated that the prohibition of one particular
opinion is not constitutional without evidence of valid reasons for regulation.36
This early opinion against viewpoint discrimination in public schools implies
that public schools may not utilize this type of discrimination in any manner.
Tinker, however, dealt specifically with student speech that happened to occur
on school property, not student speech directly tied to the school or speech that
carries the school's imprimatur or mark.
Once adopted by the circuit courts, the Tinker standard was interpreted
to mean that officials could restrict potentially disrupting speech where there
27 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that students should be al-
lowed to display freedom buttons "where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings and
schoolrooms do not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school").
28 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
29 Id. at 506.
30 Id. at 514.
31 Id. at 508.
32 Byars, 363 F.2d at 749.
33 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
34 Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
35 Id. at 510-11.
36 Id. at 511.
[Vol. 110
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was rational basis for the restriction. 3 This interpretation, however, dealt spe-
cifically with potentially disrupting speech and did not provide school officials
great deference when restricting student speech focused on ideological view-
points.
The Court attempted and failed to clarify the issue of viewpoint dis-
crimination in Hazelwood, creating the split among the circuits about a school's
ability to regulate student speech by employing viewpoint discrimination when
the speech carries the imprimatur of the school.38
B. The Deferential Approach: How Hazelwood Gave Power Back to the
Schools
The Hazelwood decision revolved around the question as to whether a
school may restrict a student's speech when the speech is inherently attached to
the school. 39 The student newspaper, Spectrum, was written and edited by stu-
dents taking the Journalism II class under supervision of a faculty advisor.40
The journalism teacher subsequently submitted the materials to the principal, for
review and approval.4 ' Upon one of these reviews, the principal decided not to
publish an article detailing the lives of pregnant teenagers at Hazelwood East.42
Because there was no time to make changes to the article, he eliminated the two
pages where the alleged offensive materials occurred.4 3
Upon hearing the students' belief that their First Amendment rights had
been violated, the matter was taken to court. The District Court held that school
officials may impose regulations on student speech that is linked to an "integral
part" of the school's education purpose so long as the regulations are reason-
able. 44 It concluded that the principal had a reasonable basis for not publishing
37 Compare Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th Cir. 1980) (commenting on the
restriction of speech in a student newspaper to prevent a potential disruption: "Such disruption,
however, is merely one justification for school authorities to restrain the distribution of a publica-
tion; nowhere has it been held to be the sole justification."), with Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch.
Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[T]here must be demonstrable factors that would give
rise to any reasonable forecast ... [of] disruption of school activities before expression may be
constitutionally restrained. . . . such paramount freedoms as speech and expression cannot be
stifled on the sole ground of intuition."), and Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1051
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that principal Robert Andrews acted reasonably by restricting a school
publication that contained a threatening letter from the lacrosse team: "[T]he court is satisfied that
defendant Andrews had a rational basis grounded in fact for his conclusion that publication would
create a substantial risk of disruption of school activities.").
38 See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
39 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
40 Id. at 262-63.
41 Id. at 263.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 264.
44 Id. (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
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the article, mostly due to the fact that the anonymous teens in the article were
easily identifiable.45 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that a
school newspaper was a public forum and thus school officials were precluded
from censoring content. 46
The Eighth Circuit applied Tinker and held that the school officials may
censor when "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with
school work or discipline ... or the rights of others. 47 On certiorari, the Su-
preme Court confronted two major issues: whether school officials may restrict
student speech in a medium such as a school newspaper and, more importantly,
whether Tinker controls with respect to school-sponsored student speech. The
Court held, in equal parts, that Tinker does not extend to school-sponsored me-
diums and that school officials may exercise control over "student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities as long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
' 48
After concluding that the school newspaper was not a designated public
forum, 49 the Court evaluated the issue within the context of Tinker.50 It con-
cluded that a significant difference exists between "a student's personal expres-
sion that happens to occur on school" property and expression that is facilitated
through a school-sponsored medium or "expressive activities that students, par-
ents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprima-
tur of the school., 51 Resting its conclusion on the idea that a school possesses
authority over school-sponsored or school-related mediums, the Court held that
Tinker should not control the entire area of First Amendment rights in the public
school system. 52 The importance of the school's paternalistic authority over its
students, coupled with its role as an educator, justifies its ability to regulate
speech where its decision is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cems."
53
The Hazelwood Court ultimately decided that the principal acted rea-
sonably by refusing to publish the offensive articles, and thus set forth the cur-
rent standard applied by courts in the nation's public school systems.54 Al-
though the Court relied upon the importance of the school's purpose to educate
and shape youth, it did not fully address the scope of the school's authority to
45 Id.
46 Id. at 265.
47 Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
48 Id. at 273.
49 See discussion infra Part II.C.
50 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
51 Id. at 271.
52 Id. at 271-72.
53 Id. at 273.
54 Id. at 274-75.
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regulate student expression.5 Would the subjective opinions of the school offi-
cials weigh heavily on the decision as to what they decide are legitimate peda-
gogical concerns? Also, what criteria may a school use when deciding whether
to restrict certain areas of speech?
Justice Brennan recognized these concerns in his dissent, arguing that
Tinker created an objective and clear rule that should control this area of First
Amendment law,56 but the majority found it necessary to grant public schools
more authority. There is no question, however, that this grant of power also
created an opportunity for schools to abuse this power.
The potential for this abuse forms the essence of this Note. If schools
possess extensive authority in this context, students may as well shed their con-
stitutional rights whenever they get involved with school-sponsored events or
mediums. The idea that schools may apply viewpoint discrimination when
evaluating student speech destroys chances for neutrality on the issue of free
speech, for schools may widen the scope of what constitutes a legitimate peda-
gogical concern to unfair extremes. For example, if a school could simply re-
strict Christina's article because of her atheism, it would be discriminating
against her controversial viewpoint. Shouldn't the school be required to give
valid independent reasons for the restriction as opposed to pre-judging her
speech? The opportunity for reasonable discourse cannot be overstated, so
Christina should have the privilege of arguing with the school officials over the
content of her essay.
Some circuits hold that Hazelwood opened the door to this type of pa-
ternalistic authority over the students, yet the Hazelwood Court never took a
stance on the issue of viewpoint discrimination. In contrast to this interpreta-
tion, the Court seemed to disagree with the idea of extensively broad school
authority. "It is only when the decision to censor.., has no valid educational
purpose that the First Amendment is so 'directly and sharply implicate[d]' as to
require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights., 57 One
may argue that the ability of a school to censor speech based on viewpoint dis-
crimination dilutes the necessity of an educational purpose. An educational
purpose could be attributed to restrictions necessary "to assure that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners
are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity,
and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school., 58
55 Id. at 272.
56 "In Tinker, this Court struck the balance.... The 'mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint' ... does not justify official sup-
pression of student speech in the high school." Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal
citations removed).
57 Id. at 273 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (internal reference removed).
58 Id. at 27 1.
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In terms of the Christina hypothetical, if the public school justified its
educational purpose through basic disagreement with her viewpoint, the idea
that a public school exists as a marketplace of ideas is quickly lost. Under the
criteria listed in Hazelwood for what constitutes an educational purpose, Chris-
tina's essay cannot be faulted. She followed the instructions of the assignment,
wrote about a topic that is in no way vulgar or inappropriate for a younger audi-
ence, and most would perceive her essay to be attributed to her and her alone.
These considerations will be discussed more thoroughly later in this Note.
Because this area of constitutional law incorporates multi-layered legal
issues, the next section will provide a brief history on forum evaluations con-
cerning public schools and how the Supreme Court views viewpoint discrimina-
tion.
C. Forum Evaluation
Under the First Amendment, claims involving freedom of speech or ex-
pression sometimes depend upon the forum where the speech or expression oc-
curs. Three types of forums are generally recognized: traditional public fo-
rums, such as parks and sidewalks; designated forums, such as such as class-
rooms that are allowed for community use in the evenings; and non-public fo-
rums, such as restricted bulletin boards or property aligned with a highway. 59
Public schools are not considered traditional public forums, but certain medi-
ums, such as a student newspaper, may fall under the designated forum connota-
tion.6°
Designated public forums are those forums that the government has
voluntarily opened for use by the public or certain speakers for expressive activ-
ity.6 1 Speech that occurs in these forums is protected on equal status with tradi-
tional public forums, such as public parks and sidewalks, so long as the forum
remains open.62 In this sense, a student newspaper could be construed as a des-
ignated forum if the school voluntarily opened up the paper to students, a certain
class of people, and allowed the free exercise of opinion. In actuality, most
courts have adopted the Hazelwood analysis and concluded that school-
sponsored mediums are primarily nonpublic forums.
6 3
Courts employ an intent evaluation by examining various factors rele-
vant to the forum when deciding whether a governmental entity has opened up a
59 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802-806 (1985).
See generally Derek P. Langhauser, Drawing the Line Between Free and Regulated Speech on
Public College Campuses: Key Steps and the Forum Analysis, 181 EDUC. L.R. 339 (2003).
60 Dean v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 345 F. Supp 2d. 799, 806-09 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (concluding,
after providing a substantial forum evaluation, that the school's paper was a designated forum).
61 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
62 Id. at 802-03.
63 Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208 (11 th Cir. 2004).
[Vol. I110
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forum to a designated class of people for expressive activity. 64 Some of the
general factors consist of the policy and practices of the government, the nature
of the property or medium and its compatibility with expressive activity, and
consistency in granting or refusing access to the forum.65 The Hazelwood Court
used this analysis to decide whether a student newspaper constitutes a desig-
nated forum, ultimately holding that the newspaper was a closed forum and thus
the school may regulate it when driven by reasonable pedagogical concerns.
66
The Court looked at intent factors such as whether the students produced the
newspaper as part of the curriculum, whether the students received class credits
for its publication, whether a faculty member oversaw the production and re-
viewed the material, and whether the school employed practices of regulation
and censorship consistently.6 7 In the end, it held that the newspaper was not a
limited forum because the school established a clear intent to regulate it under
school curricula standards, and thus the school could disassociate itself from
certain material when it conflicted with educational goals. 68 It should be noted,
however, that some jurisdictions have evaluated school newspapers under simi-
lar standards and concluded that these papers should be held as limited forums.
69
The historical purpose of the forum evaluation is critical. Nonpublic fo-
rums, although restricted, do not allow the governmental entity to discriminate
on viewpoint: the government may impose content based restrictions when they
are "reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view. 7°  Whether or not a school-
sponsored medium such as a newspaper could be designated as a limited public
forum does not have tremendous bearing on this Note.71  For example, the
Christina hypothetical concerns a school assignment, so there is no question that
it possesses direct ties to the school's curriculum. Even if the teacher has rou-
tinely allowed her students to write about any topic or subject for this assign-
ment, there is little chance that courts would recognize it as a limited forum.
Therefore, Christina should be safe from viewpoint discrimination, no matter
the nature of the forum, if she relies upon Supreme Court precedent.72
64 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-04.
65 Id. at 802-04.
66 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
67 Id. at 267-71.
68 Id. at 270.
69 See supra note 63.
70 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (alteration in original).
71 For an alternative view on student speech from a forum perspective, see James C. Dever III,
Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel School District and Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools,
1985 DuKE L.J. 1164, 1175-77 (1985).
72 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (commenting
on nonpublic forums: "The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regula-
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III. OUTLINING THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The preceding section illustrates how the Supreme Court has shaped
First Amendment exceptions with respect to both school-sponsored and student
speech.73 Currently, jurisdictions throughout the country have reached varying
conclusions concerning the degree of school authority that Hazelwood instituted
with its standard. The distinction between the Second and Ninth Circuits, argu-
ing for viewpoint neutrality, and the First and Tenth Circuits, arguing for the
allowance of viewpoint discrimination, creates a significant divide in First
Amendment protection for students.74
The argument for public schools to remain viewpoint neutral when re-
stricting speech is well-founded in the cases Planned Parenthood v. Clark
County School District75 and Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District.
76
This Note will argue that Peck provides the proper rationale in determining that
viewpoint discrimination is prima facie unconstitutional.77
A. Federal Court Decisions Rejecting an Adoption of Viewpoint Discrimi-
nation
1. Planned Parenthood v. Clark Co. School District
Planned Parenthood, decided shortly after the Hazelwood decision, in-
volved a family planning program that claimed its First Amendment rights were
violated when the Clark County School District refused to accept its advertise-
ments in high school newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic programs.78 The
school district had adopted a policy that allowed the schools within the district
to deny advertising that did not serve the best interests of the school, and birth
control was a subject deemed regulatory because of its controversial nature.79
The court ultimately decided that the school was allowed to refuse advertising
from Planned Parenthood, holding that a school may "retain the authority to
refuse to sponsor speech that might reasonably 'associate the school with any
position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.'" 80 The court
found it highly likely that members of the public would reasonably perceive
73 See discussion supra Part II.B
74 See infra Parts III.A-B.
75 Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1991).
76 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005).
77 Id. at 633.
78 Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 820-21.
79 Id. at 82 1.80 Id. at 828 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)).
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school-sponsored publications to "bear the imprimatur of the school" and thus
associate the advertisements with the school.8 1 Although this case restricts
speech, the court employed the viewpoint neutral test when deciding whether
the restriction was justified:
The school's refusal to publish Planned Parenthood's adver-
tisements was viewpoint neutral. Planned Parenthood's adver-
tisements were rejected ... in order to maintain a position of
neutrality on the sensitive and controversial issue of family
planning and avoid being forced to open up their publications
for advertisements on both sides of the 'pro-life' - 'pro-choice'
debate.82
In essence, the Planned Parenthood court focused on the nonpublic na-
ture of the school-sponsored publications, resting its conclusion on ideals raised
in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund: "Although the avoid-
ance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting speech in a public fo-
rum, a nonpublic forum by definition is not dedicated to general debate or the
free exchange of ideas. 83 Therefore, avoidance of controversy is a sufficient
interest of the school if enacted reasonably and without viewpoint discrimina-
tion, for the school has a valid educational purpose in disassociating itself from
speech that could be erroneously attributed to the school.
2. Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District
This same analysis was used in the recent Second Circuit case Peck v.
Baldwinsville Central School District, where the Court held that viewpoint dis-
crimination is prima facie unconstitutional even if reasonably related to peda-
gogical concerns. 84 The Peck decision offers a significant foundation for future
cases concerning the extent of school regulation on speech, and this Note argues
that it correctly and sufficiently decides the issue at hand.
The First Amendment issue arose in Peck when a kindergarten student
created a poster that contained Jesus Christ for his environmental science as-
signment. The assignment instructed students to depict ways to save the envi-
ronment, such as pictures of recycling or disposing of trash, in a poster that
would subsequently be posted in the school cafeteria. Initially, the student
turned in an overtly religious poster that possessed no reference to the environ-
81 Id. at 828-29.
82 Id. at 829.
83 Id. at 829 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811
(1985)).
84 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,633 (2d Cir. 2005).
85 Id. at 622.
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ment, and the teacher informed the student's mother he should create a new
poster because the current one did not demonstrate his learning of the environ-
mental lessons.86 The second poster, although containing depictions of the envi-
ronment, still contained religious imagery such as a robed figure and a church.
The principal of the school decided that the robed figure should be blocked out
once it was posted in the cafeteria, but a large portion of the church was also
blocked out due to a mistake by a parent volunteer.87 Thus, the student and his
parents brought action under the First Amendment, arguing that the school offi-
cials did not remain viewpoint neutral when restricting the student's poster.
88
The first question raised in this case concerned whether Tinker or
Hazelwood should control, and the family argued that the more speech-
protective Tinker should control the case, thus forcing a higher burden of proof
upon the school for restricting the poster.89 In resolving this issue, the court first
provided a forum analysis, and concluded that the school cafeteria constituted a
nonpublic area.90 Because the school never displayed any inclination to open up
its cafeteria or facilities to private organizations, it was justified in regulating the
poster in a reasonable manner under the nonpublic forum standard.91 The court
proceeded to conclude that Hazelwood should control, for although Tinker of-
fers a more speech-protective standard, the poster assignment and assembly
were school-sponsored events and thus fell within the framework set forth in
Hazelwood.92 The family attempted to argue that the poster was no different
from the armbands worn in Tinker, but this argument was unpersuasive due to
the deferential policy instituted by Hazelwood coupled with the fact that the
poster assembly carried the imprimatur of the school.93 Currently, conflict still
exists over what situations trigger the Tinker or Hazelwood standard.
The Peck court proceeded to discuss the importance of remaining view-
point neutral when restricting speech under Hazelwood, thereby setting forth the
vital policies behind its decision. Following the Hazelwood standard, the school
asserted that its legitimate pedagogical concerns in restricting the poster were
that the robed figure was not responsive to the assignment, that the image was
not the student's own work, and that the display of the image at the assembly
may lead others to believe that the environmental unit included the teaching of
religion, thus raising Establishment Clause issues.94 Because the Hazelwood
standard "does not require that the guidelines be the most reasonable or the only
86 Id.
87 Id. at 622-23.
88 Id. at 625.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 627.
91 Id. at 627-29.
92 Id. at 628-29.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 629-31.
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reasonable limitations, only that they be reasonable," 95 these concerns passed
constitutional muster. The question of viewpoint discrimination, however, re-
mained as to whether the school censored the poster because it was unrespon-
sive to the assignment or because of the religious perspective offered.96 If the
school censored the poster because it was unresponsive to the assignment, the
action would be justified because it relates to legitimate pedagogical concern or
purpose in ensuring that students learn from their assignments. The school ar-
gued that Hazelwood permits schools to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint,
but that the discrimination must still fall under the reasonableness standard.97
The court, however, thought otherwise, concluding that Hazelwood does not
depart from the long-standing requirement of viewpoint neutrality.
98
The court rested its conclusion on two grounds: (1) the school in the
Hazelwood decision conceded that only viewpoint neutral restrictions were al-
lowable, so the Court was silent on the issue of viewpoint discrimination and (2)
the forum evaluation set forth in Hazelwood relied upon Supreme Court prece-
dent that expressly rejected the allowance of viewpoint discrimination." In
addressing these concerns, the Peck court stated:
Yet Hazelwood never distinguished the powerful holdings of
these cases with respect to viewpoint neutrality, or, for that mat-
ter, even mentioned, explicitly, the question of viewpoint neu-
trality. And we are reluctant to conclude that the Supreme
Court would, without discussion and indeed totally sub silentio,
overrule Cornelius and Perry - even in the limited context of
school-sponsored speech.1°°
Therefore, the court remanded the case so that further fact-finding may
be developed to resolve whether the school demonstrated viewpoint discrimina-
tion in censoring the poster.1
01
The Peck decision represents the correct interpretation of the Hazel-
wood because it recognizes the importance of Supreme Court precedent and
First Amendment freedoms. The Christina hypothetical mirrors Peck because
both involve students exercising their freedom of speech within the framework
of school assignments. Therefore, the school may argue that the controversial
nature of Christina's topic raises a legitimate pedagogical concern, thus proffer-
95 Id. at 630 (citing Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 932 (10th Cir.
2002)).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 63 1.
98 Id. at 633.
99 Id. at 632-33.
100 Id. at 633.
101 Id. at 635.
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ing the argument set forth in the Planned Parenthood case.'02 The school could
not, however, argue that Christina was unresponsive to the assignment, for its
guidelines allowed complete freedom in formulating a thesis. Therefore, the
free nature of the essay presupposed the idea that the educational purpose of the
assignment was to foster creativity. Other valid concerns will be raised later,
but it seems as if the controversy argument would represent the school's most
valid justification for censorship. Christina, however, could easily counter that
the controversy argument is tied to viewpoint discrimination, citing Supreme
Court precedent to combat the ideology of the school. 10 3 The issue becomes
much more complicated, however, once the school asserts that its role as a spe-
cial institution compels viewpoint-based decisions1
°4
B. Federal Court Decisions Holding that Viewpoint Discrimination is a
Necessary Tool for Public School Officials
The First and Tenth Circuits expressly hold that Hazelwood granted
school officials the authority to utilize viewpoint discrimination when making
pedagogical decisions. Although Hazelwood is silent on the issue, these juris-
dictions argue that this deferential approach is implicit within the Supreme
Court's reasoning. Both Ward v. Hickey 05 and Fleming v. Jefferson County
School District'06 rely on the principle that the school represents a unique envi-
ronment and thus requires a great deal of deference in its decision-making so
that it may function properly. Essentially, these two circuits broadly interpret
Hazelwood to give more authority to the public school system, holding that
viewpoint discrimination is a necessary tool for school officials to utilize in
making the proper decisions about its pedagogical goals.
1. Ward v. Hickey
The dispute in Ward concerned a ninth grade biology teacher's discus-
sion of the abortion of fetuses plagued with Down's Syndrome. °7 Upon her
denial of reappointment for the next school year, she brought action against the
102 Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1991).
103 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("Viewpoint discrimination is ... an egregious form of content discrimination. The government
must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction."); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) ("Especially where ... the legislature's suppression of speech
suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its
views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended.").
104 See Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institu-
tions, 1988 DuKE L.J. 685, 699-705 (1988).
105 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
106 Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
107 Ward, 996 F.2d at 450.
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School Committee of the Town of Belmont alleging a violation of her First
Amendment right to discuss controversial issues in class.'08 In deciding this
case, the court began by analogizing the forum issue alongside Hazelwood, and
concluded that a teacher's statements in the classroom constitute a school-
sponsored forum and, therefore, are subject to reasonable limitations."' 9 The
court proceeded to discuss and distinguish Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educator's Association 01 which held that a school "may reserve the fo-
rum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regu-
lation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view.""'  To separate itself from
this holding, the Ward court held that Perry is inapplicable to school curricula
speech: "A faculty mailing system significantly differs from a school-sponsored
curriculum being taught to a captive audience of youngsters."
'" 12
The court also advances the "silent" argument, or the idea that Hazel-
wood allows viewpoint discrimination because it did not expressly reject the
concept. 113 This line of reasoning was also adopted in Fleming v. Jefferson
County School District, ultimately concluding that the nature of the Hazelwood
opinion implicitly grants school officials the necessary and authoritarian discre-
tion to control student speech.
2. Fleming v. Jefferson County School District
The Fleming decision focused on the importance for schools to carry a
broad scope of authority when dealing with controversial matters. 114 The issue
arose out of a school-sponsored tile project to commemorate the victims of a
school shooting." 5 The school allowed parents to help with the project, but set
stringent guidelines on the permissible content of the tiles." 6 Certain parents
brought action against the school claiming that their children's First Amend-
108 Id. at 450-51.
109 Id. at 453.
110 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
II Id. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 131 (1981)).
112 Ward, 996 F.2d at 454; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986)
(holding that a school may "disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech
and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school educa-
tion").
113 "Indeed, while citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, the Court in Kuhlmeier did not require that school
regulation of school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral." Ward, 996 F.2d at 454 (internal
citation omitted).
114 See generally Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 2002).
15 Id.
116 Id. at 921.
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ment rights were violated when the school disallowed the display of religious
symbols or the date of the shooting on the tiles."
7
After holding that Hazelwood allows educators to exercise reasonable
control over school-sponsored speech, such as the tile project, it concluded that
Hazelwood also allows school officials to employ viewpoint-based discrimina-
tion.' 18 The court proceeded to make this presumptive conclusion:
In light of the Court's emphasis on the "special characteristics
of the school environment" . . . and the deference to be ac-
corded to school administrators about pedagogical interests, it
would make no sense to assume that Hazelwood did nothing
more than simply repeat the traditional nonpublic forum analy-
sis in school cases."19
The Fleming court proceeded to provide a detailed analysis of the im-
portance for the allowance of viewpoint discrimination in the public school sys-
tem. These arguments will be evaluated in the next section of this Note along-
side the arguments against viewpoint discrimination, for both sides require an
extensive illustration due to the loaded constitutional question at hand.
IV. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS MUST REMAIN OPEN TO STUDENTS IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: WHY REASONABLE DISCOURSE WILL ALWAYS OUTWEIGH
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The main argument formulated by circuits supporting viewpoint dis-
crimination with respect to school-sponsored speech rests on the idea that the
school is a unique environment, one that necessarily requires a broad sweep of
discretionary authority. These arguments may be formulated either by referring
to the school as the speaker 20 or through policy concerns,1 21 each carrying sig-
nificant weight.
The school-as-speaker argument focuses on the idea that the govern-
ment may regulate its own speech because it is in control of expressing a par-
ticular stance. 22 The policy-driven argument, that the school represents aunique atmosphere, possesses much more strength, for one may argue that
17 Id. at 922.
118 Id. at 926.
119 Id.
120 C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir.1999), affid en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2000).
121 See generally Fleming, 298 F.3d at 918.
122 See generally Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finlay 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Rust v. Sulli-
van, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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school officials need broad discretion in avoiding unnecessary controversy to
properly run their schools.123 In the end, however, the public interest of student
freedoms in the public school setting outweigh the paternalistic philosophy that
school officials may employ reasonable viewpoint discrimination with no re-
strictions. 1
24
The school-as-speaker argument focuses on the idea that the State may
make content-based choices when it assumes the role of the speaker.' 25 Because
the State functions as its own speaker "it may take legitimate and appropriate
steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted.' 26 Therefore, if
the public school assumes the role of the speaker, it may make content-based
decisions to effectively convey its pedagogical message:
We conclude that when a public high school is the speaker, its
control of its own speech is not subject to the constraints of
constitutional safeguards and forum analysis, but instead is
measured by practical considerations applicable to any individ-
ual's choice of how to convey oneself: among other things,
content, timing, and purpose.
127
The case C.H. v. Oliva takes this idea one step further, holding that
where the school assumes the role of the speaker, which is likely to occur when-
ever a school-sponsored event takes place or where an activity carries the im-
primatur of the school, it may censor student speech when the speech is "pro-
moted" by the institution. 128 It distinguishes Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the University of Virginia, which held that viewpoint discrimination is inap-
propriate where the State facilitates private speech through extracurricular ac-
tivities, by arguing that school-funded extracurricular speech does not carry the
voice of the school. 129 This distinction hinges on the idea that school speech
carrying the mark of the institution may "occur in a traditional classroom set-
ting, . . . supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to students...,,13o or speech linked to the school's curricu-
lum and pedagogical concerns.
In applying this argument to the Christina hypothetical, one must care-
fully evaluate the language found in Rosenberger and Hazelwood. Allowing the
123 Fleming, 298 F.3d at 928.
124 Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 633 (2nd Cir. 2005).
125 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
126 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
127 Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000).
128 C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 173 (3rd Cir. 1999), aff'd en banc, 226 F.3d 198
(3rd Cir. 2000).
129 Id.
130 Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
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school to determine "the content of the education it provides"' 31 is far different
from allowing the school to censor a student's private speech for a school as-
signment, for the latter situation represents discrimination upon a viewpoint.
Christina was responding to an essay that allowed for complete freedom in its
production, so the classroom, acting as the voice of the school, essentially facili-
tated a diversity of viewpoints. It would seem quite unreasonable for the school
to subsequently step in and tell Christina that her assignment was not truly free
from restrictions because the school disagrees with the viewpoint of atheism.
Also, it would be difficult for anyone to believe that Christina assumes the role
of a school "agent" when delivering the content of her essay. Most arguments
for the allowance of unrestricted government speech occur where the school
board or governmental agency speaks, not where a student expresses herself
independently of the school board's ideology.' 32 In this case, it would be diffi-
cult to show that Christina is promoting the school's viewpoints through exer-
cising her private speech in an essay. Similar to Rosenberger, the school would
be tolerating her viewpoint because the nature of the essay was to facilitate a
diversity of thought and critical thinking, and this aim represents the educational
purpose or legitimate pedagogical concern.
1 33
The school-as-speaker argument, that a significant difference exists be-
tween extracurricular and curricular speech, should not determine whether a
school may exercise viewpoint discrimination. School assignments and student
publications both carry educational value in the public high school setting, for
both areas provide students with academic credit. One cannot in good faith as-
sume that sections written by students naturally carry an endorsement by the
public school. Creative expression in academic endeavors is a vital freedom
that students possess, but this freedom is abridged if schools would be allowed
to reject expression on the basis of viewpoint with no independent reason.
The best argument for the allowance of viewpoint discrimination falls
under the policy concern that public schools should naturally be in control of
what is expressed in their hallways: "A school must also retain the authority to
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate
drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with
'the shared values of a civilized social order' or to associate the school with any
position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy. 1 34 Fleming
relied on this language to conclude that viewpoint discrimination is necessary to
properly control the messages expressed in the school environment. This pro-
vides a better framework for schools supporting viewpoint discrimination, for
the state-as-speaker argument does not have much force due to the reality that
most people do not consider students as agents of the schools.
131 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
132 Downs, 228 F.3d at 1012-13.
133 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
134 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
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Although this argument of deference seems logical, the potential for
abuse naturally accrues with this constitutionally-shielded power. Student
speech that advocates use of drugs or alcohol definitely carries no educational
weight, but a sufficient number of independent reasons exist that would allow
schools to avoid viewpoint discrimination entirely. Fleming misconstrues the
concept of viewpoint discrimination when discussing language that promotes
drugs or vulgarity: "No doubt the school could promote student speech advo-
cating against drug use, without being obligated to sponsor speech with the op-
posing viewpoint. Hazelwood entrusts to educators these decisions that require
judgments based on viewpoint."
1 35
In this situation, however, the schools would merely be making content
discriminations expressly allowed in Bethel School District v. Fraser.'36 One
need only look to the language employed by Chief Justice Burger in his opinion:
Unlike ... Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unre-
lated to any political viewpoint. The First Amendment does not
prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a
vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's would undermine
the school's basic educational mission.
137
A significant difference exists between speech that adds to civilized dis-
course and speech that by its nature conflicts with the educational missions of
public schools. In this instance, the school may simply argue that the exposure
to vulgar language in the absence of supervision would place students into a
coercive environment, therefore justifying the restriction under captive audience
theories. 138 Although Fleming argues that Hazelwood naturally provides the
tool of viewpoint discrimination, it only expressly allows them to "retain the
authority" to make reasonable decisions related to pedagogical concerns.
139
The major issue in the constitutionality of viewpoint discrimination,
however, concerns the ability of schools to censor controversial viewpoints.
The censoring of Christina's essay would stifle her fundamental liberty of free
speech, especially if based upon her viewpoint. Reasonable alternatives such as
providing a disclaimer for the school to disassociate itself from her message or
asserting other independent reasons represent narrowly tailored means that both
respect the school's authority while protecting a student's rights. 40 Justice
135 Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 928 (10th Cir. 2005).
136 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
137 Id. at 685.
138 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). This argument focuses on the fact that
alleged objectionable material cannot be regulated in certain situations, and therefore unwilling
parties are coerced into the exposure of the objectionable speech as a captive audience. Id. at 748-
49.
139 Hazelwood, 484 U.S at 272.
140 Id. at 289.
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Brennan argued that allowing reasonable regulations of potentially controversial
material constitutes a "vaporous nonstandard"'141 and acknowledges how the
Hazelwood opinion "aptly illustrates how readily school officials (and courts)
can camouflage viewpoint discrimination as the 'mere' protection of students
from sensitive topics. ' ' 142 The protective argument, of course, opens the door to
viewpoint discrimination, but it, at the very least, requires the school to assert a
reasonable justification for its censorship.
Although the Planned Parenthood case held that the avoidance of con-
troversy justifies a reasonable regulation, 43 Christina may find solace in the fact
that her essay in no way may be associated with the school. A school yearbook
accepting advertisements is far different from a student writing a non-restrictive
essay, for the reasonable observer could quickly associate advertisements for
birth control with the school but would not be as quick to associate a student's
essay with the policy of the school board. 44 To avoid the "Orwellian guardian-
ship of the public mind,"'14 5 a school must encourage freedom of thought and
expression. Allowing viewpoint discrimination completely disregards years of
Supreme Court precedent that expressly condemns the practice, while creating a
dim-lit environment where students may as well shed their constitutional rights
at the door.
V. How PUBLIC SCHOOLS SHOULD VIEW THE ISSUE: STRIKING A BALANCE
BETWEEN STUDENTS AND THE SCHOOL SYSTEM'S EDUCATIONAL MISSION
In the grand scheme of things, the issue of student speech in the public
school system presents a battle between the government and individual free-
doms. Within this spectrum rests the role of educators and children, and this
divide is presented most clearly in Tinker. 46 We must ask ourselves how much
power we want government educators to exercise over our children's develop-
ment. French philosopher Michael Foucault describes the exercise of power as
"a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions.., a way of
acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being
capable of action."'' 47 Foucault claims that a significant entanglement exists
141 Id. at 287.
142 Id. at 288.
143 Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991).
144 In issues concerning the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
applies a reasonable observer test to decide if there is sufficient government endorsement of relig-
ion. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
145 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 286 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945)).
146 See discussion supra Part II.A.
147 Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRMCAL INQUIRY 777, 789 (1982).
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between individual freedoms and governmental power, arguing that the two are
not mutually exclusive. Essentially, he argues that the power to govern is dis-
persed throughout all aspects of life, directing the actions of its citizenry so as to
"structure the possible field of action of others."'' 48 A "field of action" repre-
sents the thought process of the government's citizens, for the government
would control the actions and ideas of its citizens through its exercise of power.
If one is to accept this skeptical but realistic view of government, con-
cerns immediately arise about the scope of school power in restricting the ex-
pression of students. Allowing school officials to discriminate among view-
points immediately shuts the door to discourse and reason, and in promoting
such an exercise of power, the schools implicitly enforce a field of action upon
their students. This field of action indirectly tells students that their controver-
sial or topical opinions have no value within the educational system, which
abridges the principles found within the majority opinion in Tinker.149 The ex-
tent of a school's ability to direct the action of its students requires a balancing
with the rights of students if a school is to be viewed as a marketplace of ideas:
"If school officials enjoy carte blanche in their educational choices, then com-
pulsory attendance, combined with students' inability to evaluate critically the
school's message, creates a dangerous threat of indoctrination."' 
50
Did the school in Christina's situation direct a field of action? One
must look to the potential abuse of such a restriction, for the evils of viewpoint
discrimination manifest in indirect ways. Students who share similar views with
Christina, or who hold opinions that are just as controversial, will interpret the
school's restriction as bias and prejudice. This governmental action sends them
a message that their opinions will never be given an adequate platform in the
schools. For many students, the school acts as the only medium for reasonable
discourse about differing philosophies and opinions, so shutting this medium
down is detrimental to certain groups of students. The school's ability to em-
ploy viewpoint discrimination chills the speech of its entire student body and
directs a field of action that tells students that it is better sit down than to stand
up and develop discourse within the marketplace of ideas. In essence, the
school indoctrinates its students into accepting and believing the orthodoxy that
topical discussions contain no value in their quest for education.
In the past, the Supreme Court has promoted the idea that "[t]he vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the commu-
nity of American schools.'1 5' This philosophy cannot coexist with viewpoint
discrimination. Scholars have argued, however, that the requirement of view-
148 Id. at 790.
149 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
150 C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, When Students Speak: Judicial Review in the
Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 343, 383 (1989).
151 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
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point neutrality would "paralyze [school administrators]. '',15 Those in favor of
viewpoint discrimination focus on the importance of the school's ability to
shape and educate the youth, arguing that a significant divide exists between
First Amendment principles for adults and children. Former professor Bruce C.
Hafen elaborates:
[T]he question whether authoritarian or anti-authoritarian ap-
proaches will best develop the minds and expressive powers of
children is more a matter of educational philosophy and practice
than of constitutional law. For that reason alone, first amend-
ment theories applied by courts largely on the basis of anti-
authoritarian assumptions are at best a clumsy and limited
means of ensuring optimal educational development, whether
the goal is an understanding of democratic values or a mastery
of basic intellectual skills. Thus, one of Hazelwood's major
contributions is its reaffirmation of schools' institutional role -
and their accountability to the public for fulfilling it responsibly
- in nurturing the underlying values of the First Amendment. 153
Because of these concerns, a balance must be reached between the
schools and the students, or between power and freedom. One must look to the
"Archimedean point," where students and educators meet to properly shape the
future of the citizenry.' 4 Archimedes employed this technique within the field
of physics to separate himself from his own beliefs about science so he could
achieve an objective perspective.' 55
The Archimedean point, an evaluative technique created by the Greek
mathematician Archimedes, asks one to separate herself from the subject of
inquiry to see its relation to all other things:
The pursuit of the ideal education, like the pursuit of justice, re-
quires objectivity, reflection, detachment, and also immersion in
actual experience and in the contingent world inhabited by so-
cial beings. Both educators and philosophers "need an 'Archi-
152 Janna J. Annest, Only the News That's Fit to Print: The Effect of Hazelwood on the First
Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L.
REV. 1227, 1256 (2002).
153 Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions,
1988 DuKE L.J. 685, 701 (1988); see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 910 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("In short, actions by the government as educator do not raise the same First
Amendment concerns as actions by the government as sovereign.").
154 Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archi-
medean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 527 (1984).
155 Huw PRICE, TIME'S ARROW & ARCHIMEDES' PoINT 4 (1996) ("One of the great projects in
the history of modern thought has been the attempt to achieve the untainted perspective, the
Archimedean view of reality - 'the view from nowhere ... ').
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medean point' from which to assess the basic structure of soci-
ety ... ,,156
This technique allows school officials to evaluate their actions within
the complete spectrum of the educational realm and thus strip themselves of bias
and authoritarian power. According to Mark G. Yudof, "The ideal education
necessarily requires the location of an Archimedean point, a point positioned
somewhere between critical reflection and grounding in the contingent circum-
stances of society.'
157
Of course, how educators are to reach this point cannot be easily an-
swered, but one step towards realizing this goal would be the elimination of
viewpoint discrimination. If school officials removed themselves from their
positions as authority figures and objectively evaluated the abusive nature of
viewpoint discrimination, they could see that enforcing viewpoint discrimina-
tion implicitly indoctrinates the students into accepting a field of action that
promotes the suppression of ideas. In her book Democratic Education, Amy
Guttman discusses the importance of the principle of "nonrepression": "[Non-
repression] secures freedom from interference only to the extent that it forbids
using education to restrict rational deliberation or consideration of different
ways of life." 158 Discourse exists to combat this restriction and allows students
to acquire critical thinking skills necessary for life while not being indoctrinated
by school officials.
School officials may counter that the suppression of certain ideas,
whether vulgar or racist, is necessary in creating the proper forum for education.
Therefore, without viewpoint discrimination, the school must open the door to
views that promote recreational usage of drugs or white supremacy. With re-
spect to vulgarity, school officials absolutely may step in and restrict speech that
promotes sex or drugs in a disruptive manner, for no rational deliberation may
develop from these views. 59 But this represents a content discrimination over
subject matter that by its nature conflicts with a school's educational mission.
The marketplace of ideas theory relates to opinions that add and do not detract
from reasonable discourse of issues in society. A club that wishes to promote
racism would also interfere with the school's basic educational missions, for it
would potentially disrupt the safe environment that schools are required to pro-
vide.
160
156 Yudof, supra note 1544, at 528-29 (citations omitted).
157 Id. at 529.
158 AMY GUTrMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 44 (1987).
159 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
160 West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
student's display of the confederate flag may be restricted where "officials had reason to believe
that a student's display of the Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the rights
of other students to be secure and let alone"). See generally Ellen E. Lange, Racist Speech on
Campus: A Title VII Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 105 (1990).
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At the end of the day, public schools protect children from culturally
immoral views and violence, but this opens the door to attack from pro-
viewpoint discrimination supporters. Shouldn't schools be allowed to discrimi-
nate among viewpoints that promote such immoral activity? No, they should
not, but schools may still assert independent reasons reasonably related to le-
gitimate pedagogical concerns that allow restrictions on speech.16' The school's
role as guardian passes this test and at the same time avoids any discrimination
among viewpoints, for the content limitations on lewdness and the need to pro-
vide a safe environment for students naturally coincide with the school's educa-
tional mission.
But what about those parents who feel that atheism is an immoral way
of life and want their children protected from any reference to its principles?
The role of the educator, evaluating from the Archimedean point, must look to
the totality of the situation and come to one conclusion: avoidance of contro-
versy does not outweigh the freedom of students to debate and discuss substan-
tive principles and ideas. The potential for abuse that comes with viewpoint
discrimination is far too great of a danger, for it destroys a student's ability for
intellectual development for the sake of avoiding topical issues to appease those
who are not involved in the marketplace of ideas. Yudof presents this idea more
eloquently:
Children must be integrated into the community but they should
not be stifled. The desire to create informed citizens who un-
derstand the world in which they were born and live must be
tempered by the realization that much of what society achieves
depends on individuals who do not or will not conform to the
prevailing wisdom. . . . Children must learn the rules of the
game, but that learning must stop short of an orthodoxy that
playing after dark is always forbidden. 162
The orthodoxy that follows from viewpoint discrimination must be
stopped now, for students who accept the suppression of their ideas are lost in
totalitarianism.
VL CONCLUSION
Christina's name is called by the principal at the school assembly. The
anxiety rabidly eats away at her stomach, for she knows that her opinions are
controversial. She knows that some students will disagree with anything that
comes out of her mouth because they are naturally biased against her views.
She also knows, however, that others are interested in what she has to express.
161 See discussion supra Part II.B.
162 Yudof, supra note 1544, at 530.
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She knows that these students want to hear her side of the debate and desire an
informed opinion on the matter. She knows that her speech will add to the mar-
ketplace of ideas and be treated with respect. She knows that her viewpoint will
be allowed its proper expression. As her anxiety fades, Christina realizes some-
thing drastically important: the school has provided her with an opportunity to
enter into the realm of discourse that normally would be rejected. As the princi-
pal calls her name, she walks to the podium and shakes his hand, acknowledging
the fact that the school understands the importance of protecting her freedom of
expression.
Stifling the speech of students leads to an abridgment of free thought
and discourse. The direction of this field of action will keep students quiet, thus
shutting down any opportunity for a sufficient marketplace of ideas. If one
imagines the student standing at the schoolhouse gate where viewpoint dis-
crimination is employed at great lengths, the student will implicitly shed her
constitutional right of free speech at the door.1 63 An illustration of the effects
that this denial of speech will have on the student as an adult may be properly
displayed in Franz Kafka's short work, Before the Law, where one stands con-
flicted on whether to express his voice in the shadow of the government:
Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the doorkeeper steps to
one side, the man stoops to peer through the gateway into the
interior. Observing that, the doorkeeper laughs and says: "If
you are so drawn to it, just try to go in despite my veto. But
take note: I am powerful. And I am only the least of the door-
keepers. From hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another,
each more powerful than the last. The third doorkeeper is al-
ready so terrible that even I cannot bear to look at him." These
are difficulties the man from the country has not expected; the
Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to
everyone, but as he now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in
his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar
beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he gets permission
to enter.164
Citizens need not get permission to express their rights. If school offi-
cials wish to indoctrinate students into accepting this idea, the marketplace of
ideas within society will be severely hindered for future citizens.
This freedom of expression cannot be overstated. Students are currently
in danger of forfeiting these rights if schools are granted the authority to dis-
163 "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas .... ." Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting Keyishian v. Rd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
164 Franz Kafka, Before the Law, in EXISTENTIALISM 167 (Robert C. Solomon ed., 1974).
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criminate among viewpoints. This Note attempts to place the evils of viewpoint
discrimination into perspective and call for its end in the public school system.
Hazelwood should not be read to provide this broad sweep of authority, for it
allows school officials to avoid an evaluation from the Archimedean point. To
achieve balance, all must cooperate in preserving the freedoms of students
across the country.
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